The innovative studies of the Gardners (1-3) and Premack (4) (5) (6) show that a chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) can learn substantial vocabularies of "words" of visual languages. The Gardners taught Washoe, an infant female chimpanzee, signs of American Sign Language (ASL) (7, 8) . Premack taught Sarah, a juvenile female, an artificial language of plastic song when asserting territory. Such rigidity is typical of the communicative behavior of other genera, for example, bees communicating about the location and quality of food or sticklebacks engaging in courtship behavior (14) .
Human language is most distinctive because of a second level of structure that subsumes the word-the sentence Summary. More than 19 ,000 multisign utterances of an infant chimpanzee (Nim) were analyzed for syntactic and semantic regularities. Lexical regularities were observed in the case of two-sign combinations: particular signs (for example, more) tended to occur in a particular position. These regularities could not be attributed to memorization or to position habits, suggesting that they were structurally constrained. That conclusion, however, was invalidated by videotape analyses, which showed that most of Nim's utterances were prompted by his teacher's prior utterance, and that Nim interrupted his teachers to a much larger extent than a child interrupts an adult's speech. Signed utterances of other apes (as shown on films) revealed similar nonhuman patterns of discourse.
chips of different colors and shapes. In a related study, Rumbaugh et al. (9) taught Lana, also a juvenile chimpanzee, to use Yerkish, an artificial visual language. These and other studies (10), one of which reports the acquisition of more than 400 signs of ASL by a female gorilla named Koko (11), show that the shift from a vocal to a visual medium can compensate effectively for an ape's inability to articulate many sounds (12). That limitation alone might account for earlier failures to teach chimpanzees to communicate with spoken words (13).
Human language makes use of two levels of structure: the word and the sentence. The meaning of a word is arbitrary. This is in contrast to the fixed character of various forms of animal communication. Many bird species, for example, sing one song when in distress, one song when courting a mate, and one SCIENCE, VOL. 206, 23 NOVEMBER 1979 SCIENCE quences produced and understood by their pongid subjects were governed by grammatical rules. The Gardners, for example, note that "The most significant results of Project Washoe were those based on comparisons between Washoe and children, as . . . in the use of order in early sentences" (3, p. 73) .
If an ape can truly create a sentence there would be a reason for asserting, as Patterson (11) has, that "language is no longer the exclusive domain of man." The purpose of this article is to evaluate that assertion. We do so by summarizing the main features of a large body of data that we have collected from a chimpanzee exposed to sign language during its first 4 years. A major component of these data is the first corpus of the multisign utterances of an ape. Superficially, many of its utterances seem like sentences. However, objective analyses of our data, as well as of those obtained by ape's ability to use a grammar. Each instance of presumed grammatical competence could be explained adequately by simple nonlinguistic processes.
Project Nim
Our subject was a male chimpanzee, Neam Chimpsky (Nim for short) (16, 17) . Since the age of 2 weeks, Nim was raised in a home environment by human surrogate parents and teachers who communicated with him and amongst themselves in ASL (7, 8) . Nim was trained to sign by a method modeled after the techniques that the Gardners (2) and Fouts (18) have referred to as molding and guidance. Our methods of data collection paralleled those used in studies of the development of language in children (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (15). A sentence characteristically expresses a complete semantic proposition through a set of words and phrases, each bearing particular grammatical relations to one another (such as actor, action, object). Unlike words, most sentences cannot be learned individually. Psychologists, psycholinguists, and linguists are in general agreement that using a human language indicates knowledge of a grammar. How else can one account for a child's ultimate ability to create an 'indeterminate number of meaningful sentences from a finite number of words?
Recent demonstrations that chimpanzees and gorillas can communicate with humans via arbitrary "words" pose a controversial question: Is the ability to create and understand sentences uniquely human? The Gardners (1, 3) , Premack (6) , Rumbaugh (9), and Patterson (11) have each proposed that the symbol se-signs were spontaneous, prompted, Table 1 . Number of tokens and types of commolded, or approximations of the correct binations containing two, three, four, and five sign (25 The Gardners' analyses of Washoe's sign combinations prevents one from studying their grammatical structure. With but two minor exceptions, the Gardners did not report the order of signs of Washoe's multisign combinations (27). For example, more tickle and tickle more were both reported as inwhether Washoe's multisign combinations obeyed rules of sign order (28). One could conclude that Washoe had learned that both more and tickle were appropriate ways of requesting that tickling reoccur and that when Washoe signed both signs it was because of her prior training to sign each sign separately.
We defined a combination of signs as the occurrence of two or more different signs that were not interrupted by the occurrence of other behavior or by the return of the hands to a relaxed position (29). Of Nim's combinations, 95 percent consisted of sequences of distinct signs that occurred successively. These are referred to as "liiear sequences." Two other kinds of combinations were not included in the corpus: contractions of two or more signs and simultaneous combinations in which two distinct signs occurred at the same time. Even though such combinations can occur in ASL, they were excluded from our corpus because it was impossible to specify the temporal order of the signs they contained. Figure 1 shows a typical linear combination, me hug cat, in which there is no temporal overlap between any of the signs.
In no instance were specific sequences, contractions, or simultaneous combinations reihforced differentially.
Indeed, Nim was never required to make a combination of signs as opposed to a single sign. However, Nim's teachers often signed to him in stereotyped orders modeled after English usage, and they Fig. 1 The sheer variety of types of combinations and the fact that Nim was not required to combine signs suffices to show that Nim's combinations were not v learned by rote. The occurrence of more than 2700 types of combinations of twoand three-sign combinations would strain the capacity of any known estimate of a chimpanzee's memory. As was mentioned earlier, however, a large variety of combinations is not sufficient to demonstrate that such combinations are sentences; that is, that they express a semantic proposition in a rule-governed se-,-quence of signs. In the absence of additional evidence, the simplest explanation of Nim's utterances is that they are unstructured combinations of signs, in which each sign is separately appropriate to the situation at hand.
The regularity of Nim's combinations suggest that they were generated by rules and was most pronounced in the case of two-sign combinations. As shown in Table 2 , more + X is more frequent than X + more, give + X is more frequent than X + give, and verb + me or Nim is more frequent than me or Nim + verb. An example of the regularities in Nim's two-sign combinations, 23 NOVEMBER 1979 consisting of all transitive verbs combined with all references to himself (me or Nim), is shown in The accuracy of such predictions was tested by allocating each sign of a twosign sequence to a lexical category and then using the relative frequencies of these lexical categories to predict the probabilities of each two-sign lexical type. The predicted value of the proba- Relation between Nim's two-, threeandfour-sign combinations. As children increase the length of their utterances, they elaborate their initially short utterances to provide additional information about some topic (20, 22) . For The apparent topic of Nim's three-sign combinations overlapped considerably with the apparent topic of his two-sign combinations ( Table 4) . Eighteen of Nim's 25 most frequent two-sign combinations can be seen in his 25 most frequent three-sign combinations, in virtually the same order in which they appear in his two-sign combinations. Furthermore, if one ignores sign order, all but five signs that appear in Nim's 25 most Though lexically similar to two-sign combinations, the three-sign combinations (Table 4) (20) (21) (22) . In English, for example, subject-verb and verb-object construction merge into subject-verb-object constructions. Figure 2 shows Nim's MLU (the mean number of signs in each utterance) between the ages of 26 and 45 months (39) . The most striking aspect of these functions is the lack of growth of Nim's MLU during a 19-month period. Figure 2 also shows comparable MLU functions obtained from hearing (speaking) and deaf (signing) children (40) , including the smallest normal growth of MLU of a speaking child that we could locate. All children start at an MLU similar to Nim's at 26 months, but, unlike Nim, the children all show increases in MLU.
Another difference between Nim's and childrens' MLU has to do with the value of the MLU and its upper bound. According to Brown, ". . . the upper bound of the (MLU) distribution is very reliably related to the mean.... At MLU = 2.0 the upper bound will be, most liberally, 5 ± 2" (41). Nevertheless, with an MLU of 1.6 Nim made utterances containing as many as 16 signs (give orange me give eat orange me eat orange give me eat orange give me you). In our discourse analyses of Nim's and Washoe's signing (see below), we suggest mechanisms that can lengthen an ape's utterance but that do not presuppose an increase in se antic or syntactic competence.
\/) Semantic-reraie s hips expressed in Nim's two-sign combinations. Semantic distributions, unlike the lexical ones we discussed above, cannot be constructed directly from a corpus. In order to derive a semantic distribution, observers have to make judgments as to what each combination means. Procedures for making A& .x such judgments, introduced by Bloom (19, 20) and Schlesinger (42) , are known as the method of "rich interpretation" (21) (22) (23) 42 ). An observer relates the utterance's immediate context to its contents. Supporting evidence for semantic judgments includes the following observations. The child's choice of word order is usually the same as it would be if the idea were being expressed in the canonical ( adult form. As the child's MLU increases, semantic relationships identified by a rich interpretation develop in an orderly fashion (20, 22, 43) . The relationships expressed in two-word combinations are the first ones to appear in the three-and four-word combinations. Many longer utterances appear to be composites of the semantic relationships expressed in shorter utterances (20, 22) . Studies of an ape's ability to express semantic relationships in combinations 'of signs have yet to advance beyond the stage of unvalidated interpretation. The Gardners (44) and Patterson (11) concluded that a substantial portion of Washoe's and Koko's two-sign combinations were interpretable in categories similar to those used to describe two- terance.
An equally serious problem is posed by the very small number of lexical items used to express particular semantic (bird). That cannot be decided on the roles. Only when a semantic role is repbasis of a single anecdote, no matter how resented by a large variety of signs is it compelling that anecdote may seem to an reasonable to attribute position preferEnglish-speaking observer.
ences to semantic rules rather than to Without prejudging whether Nim ac-lexical position habits. For example, the tually expressed semantic relationships role of recurrence was presented excluin his combinations, we analyzed, by the sively by more. In combinations premethod of rich interpretation, 1262 of his sumed to relate an agent and an object or two-sign combinations, which occurred an object and a beneficiary, one would between the ages of 25 to 31 months (46) . expect agents and beneficiaries to be exThe results of our semantic analysis are pressed by a broad range of agents and shown in Fig. 3 . Twenty categories of se-beneficiaries, for example: Nim, me, mantic relationships account for 895 (85 you, and names of other animate'beings. percent) of the 957 interpretable two-sign However, 99 percent (N = 297) of the combinations. Brown (47) found that beneficiaries in utterances judged to be there were 11 semantic relationships that object-beneficiary combinations were account for about 75 percent of all com-Nim and me, and 76 percent (N = 35) of binations of the children he studied. Sim-the agents in'utterances judged to be ilar categories of semantic relationships agent-object combinations were you. were used by the G'ardners and by Pat-From these and other examples, it is difterson (48).
ficult to decide whether the positional Figure 3 shows several instances of regularities favoring agent-object and obsignificant preferences for placing signs ject-beneficiary constructions (Fig. 3) expressing a particular semantic role in are expressions of semantic relationships either the first or the second positions. or idiosyncratic lexical position habits.
Agent, attribute, and recurrence (more) Such isolated effects could also be exwere expressed most frequently in the pected to appear from statistically ranfirst position, while place and beneficiary dom variation. roles were expressed most frequently by Discourse analysis. An analysis of second-position signs (49) .
video transcripts revealed yet another At first glance, the results of our se-contribution to the semantic look of mantic analysis appear to be consistent Nim's combinations; his utterances were with the observations of the Gardners often initiated by his teacher's signing and Patterson. But even though our judg-and they were often full or partial imitamnents were reliable, several features of tions of his teachers' preceding utterour results suggest that our analysis, and ance. Since full or partial imitations were that of others, may exaggerate Nim's se-included in the corpus, it is possible that mantic competence. One problem is the the semantic relationships and position subjective nature of semantic inter-preferences we observed are, to 
There has been increasing interest in the way parents speak to their children (50) and in the ways children adjust their speech to aspects of the prior verbal context (51) . Fillmore (52) (Fig. 4) 
At stage 1, 21.2 percent of a child's utterances are expansions of the adult's prior utterance (range, 10 to 28 percent). On the average, only 7.3 percent of Nim's utterances were expansions of his teacher's prior utterance (range, I to 15 percent). As the child gets older, the proportion of its utterances that are expansions increases. Bloom et al. (51) 
By definition, adjacent utterances may include interruptions of a teacher's or an adult's utterance. Such interruptions detract from true conversation since they result in discourse that is simultaneous rather than successive. In 71 percent of the utterances that have been examined (425 out of 585), Nim signed simultaneously with his teacher. Of these overlapping utterances, 70 percent occurred when Nim began an utterance while the teacher was signing. When the teacher interrupted one of Nim's utterances, it was generally the case that Nim had just interrupted the teacher and the teacher was, in effect, asserting his or her right to hold the floor. Nim's interruptions show no evidence that they are in response to the teacher's attempts to take the floor from him. Few data are available concerning the relative frequency or duration of simultaneous utterances that occur in dialogues between children and adults in either spoken or sign language.
In the most relevant study we could locate, McIntyre reports that her videotape transcripts of a 13-month deaf child signing with her mother revealed virtually no interruptions of the mother's utterances (54a). Bloom (55) and Bellugi (56) Unanticipated, but instructive, examples of the influence of the teacher's signing on Nim's signing were noted ift photographs such as those shown in Fig.  1 (a series of still photographs taken with a motor-driven camera). Examination of Fig. 1 
Comparison of Nim's Discourse with That of Other Signing Apes
Two valuable sources of information that suggest that Nim's discourse with his teachers was not specific to the conditions of our project are a film produced by Nova for television, entitled, The First Signs of Washoe (57), and a film, produced by the Gardners, Teaching Sign Language to the Chimpanzee: Washoe (58) .
Consider the scene from First Signs of Washoe shown in Table 6 and in the lefthand portion of Fig. 5 (59) . In this conversation, Washoe's utterances either followed or interrupted B. Gardner's utterance. It is also the case that the sign time was uttered by B. Gardnerjust prior to Washoe's utterance time eat (60).
Teaching Sign Language to the Chimpanzee: Washoe presents a longer ver- course with her teachers, consider the conversation about Washoe's intelligence shown in Table 9 . This sequence also appears to be a drill. The important question it raises, however, is whether Washoe actually understood the meanings of stupid (and smart). Her usage of stupid was clearly imitative of her teacher. The exchange between Washoe and the teacher (Susan Nichols) was also terminated at the point at which the teacher induced Washoe to make the signs stupid and Washoe. The circumstances under which this sequence of signs occurred raises questions about the Gardners' semantic analysis of combinations such as Naiomi good (44) . That combination was presented as an example of attribution, an interpretation that would be appropriate only in the absence of the kinds of prompting and reward shown in the films of Washoe signing. The longer of these films, Teaching Sign Language to the Chimpanzee: Washoe, showed 155 of Washoe's utterances of which 120 were single-sign utterances. These occurred mainly in vocabulary testing sessions. Each of Washoe's multisign sequences (24 two-sign, 6 three-sign, and 5 four-sign sequences) were preceded by a similar utterance or a prompt from her teacher. Thus, Washoe's utterances were adjacent and imitative of her teacher's utterances. The Nova film, which also shows Ally (Nim's full brother) and Koko, reveals a similar tendency for the teacher to sign before the ape signs. Ninety-two percent of Ally's, and all of Koko's, signs were signed by the teacher immediately before Ally and Koko signed.
The data provided by a few films are admittedly much more limited in scope than data of the type we obtained from our nine videotapes. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that the segments shown in the films, the only ones available of apes signing, present the best examples of Washoe's, Ally's, and Koko's signing. Even more so than our transcripts, these films showed a consistent tendency for the teacher to initiate signing and for the signing of the ape to mirV/ ror the immediately prior signing of the teacher.
Other Evidence Bearing on an Ape's Grammatical Competence
In evaluating the claim that apes can produce and understand sentences it is important to keep in mind the lack of a single decisive test to indicate whether a particular sequence of words qualifies as 23 a sentence or whether a particular performance qualifies as an instance of grammatically guided sentence comprehension. It has been observed widely that the early sequences of words uttered by a child do not necessarily qualify as sentences (19, 24) . If, indeed, the only evidence that children could create and understand sentences were their initial utterances, and their responses to their parents' utterances, there would be little reason to conclude that a child's production and comprehension of words are governed by a grammar. A rich interpretation of a young child's early utterances assumes that they are constrained by structural rules (20, 22) . It is difficult, however, to exclude simpler accounts of such utterances. A child's isolated utterance of a sequence of words could be a haphazard concatenation of words that bear no structural relationship to one another (22) or routines that the child learns by rote as imitations of its parent's speech (24) . However, as children get older, the variety and complexity of their utterances gradually increase (21, 61) . Especially telling is the observation that children pass through phases in which they produce systematically incorrect classes of utterance. During these phases, the child apparently "tries out" different sets of rules before arriving at the correct grammar. Children are also able to discriminate grammatically correct from incorrect sentences (62) . Accordingly, explanations of their utterances that are not based upon some kind of grammar become too unwieldy to defend.
Production of sequences. Before regarding a sequence of words as sentences, it is necessary to demonstrate the insufficiency of simpler interpretations. Consider some examples of sequence production on the part of Sarah and Lana. As a result of rote training, both Sarah and Lana learned to produce specific sequences of words, for example, please machine give apple (9), or Mary give chocolate Sarah (6). Subsequently, both Sarah and Lana learned to substitute certain new words in order to obtain other incentives from the same or from other agents (for example, Randy give Sarah apple, please machine give drink, or please machine show slide). The last sequence was presented as evidence that Lana learned to use different "verbs" (give and show) in conjunction with a different category of incentives, slide, window, and music (9).
Sarah's and Lana's multisign utterances are interpretable as rotely learned sequences of symbols arranged in particular orders; for example, Mary give Sarah apple, or please machine give apple. There is virtually no evidence that Lana and Sarah understood the meaning of all of the "words" in the sequences they produced. Except for the names of the objects they requested, Sarah and Lana were unable to substitute other symbols in each of the remaining positions of the sequences they learned. Accordingly, it seems more prudent to regard the sequences of symbols glossed as please, machine, Mary, Sarah, and give as sequences of nonsense symbols (63) .
Consider comparable performance by pigeons that were trained to peck arrays of four colors in a particular sequence, A--B--*C-->D, regardless of the physical position of the colors (64). In these experiments, all colors were presented simultaneously and there was no step-bystep feedback after each response. Evidence that the subjects learned the overall sequence, and not simply the specific responses required by the training arrays was provided by performance that was considerably better than chance on novel arrays. It has yet to be shown that pigeons can master ABCX problems (where X1 could refer to one type of grain, X2 to a different type of grain, X3 to water, X4 to the opportunity to see or to attack another pigeon, and so on). If a pigeon can learn such sequences (a not unlikely outcome) one wonders what is to be gained by assigning "names" to each member of the sequence, for example, referring to the sequence, green--white--*red--blue, as machine give R42 grain.
Sequences of symbols produced by an ape may seem grammatically related to one another in the eyes of human observers. It does not, however, follow that the chimpanzee had any knowledge of the relationships that a human observer may infer (65) . As difficult as it may be to train an ape, or any organism, to produce a sequence of arbitrary responses that may look like a sentence, it is even more difficult to show that those sequences have the structural properties of human sentences (63) .
Comprehension of multiword sequences. An inherent difficulty in using apparent comprehension as an indicator of a child's syntactic competence is the frequent presence of nonsyntactic cues to meaning (22, 23) . This can be controlled if sentence comprehension experiments are designed to exclude semantic and extralinguistic cues. However, many purported examples of sentence comprehension by chimpanzees *can be explained as nonsyntactic problem-solving behavior. Even complex problems, which seem to require an understanding of the syntactic structure of the instruction (for example, conditional instructions and instructions presented in hierarchical form), could be solved by applying nonsyntactic rules (63) .
Demonstrations by Premack, Rumbaugh, and the Gardners that their chimpanzees can answer wh-questions correctly is evidence of the memory capacity of a chimpanzee. There is little reason, however, to conclude that these chimpanzees comprehended wh-questions. In each case, the chimpanzees were drilled extensively on the correct answers to questions such as color that?, what that?, and only a limited choice of answers (usually two) were available. The constant setting in which repeated problems of the same nature were administered provided ideal conditions for the establishment of learning sets and the use of nonsyntactic strategies in solving these problems. Without a greater variety of problems and a greater range of 900 possible answers, the results of such <tudies cannot be interpreted as "linguistic" demonstrations of the interpretation of wh-questions (64).
In their effort to demonstrate comprehension of wh-questions, the Gardners accepted as correct any response they designated as lexically appropriate. For example, if Washoe signed blue in answer to what color? when she was shown a red ball, blue was considered "correct" because it was a color. The significant correlation that the Gardners report between question forms and response forms shows that Washoe learned to respond to category questions with signs from the appropriate category: colors, trainers' names, actions, and so on. However, many of her specific answers were clearly inappropriate. The Gardners nevertheless concluded that Washoe's performance is comparable to that of a child at stage 3 in Brown's scheme for describing the development of language in children (22) . At this stage, children are not only able to produce correct answers to simple wh-questions, but they are also able to produce a variety of / constructions whose mean length exceeds 2.75 morphemes. The significance of analyzing child language in terms of stages derives largely from the structural complexities that a child masters, in a cumulative fashion, at each point of its development. The Gardners' conclusion does not take into account these aspects of a child's language at stage 3.
Conclusions
Projects devoted to teaching chimpanzees and gorillas to use language have shown that these apes can learn vocabularies of visual symbols. There is no evidence, however, that apes can combine such symbols in order to create new meanings. The function of the symbols of an ape's vocabulary appears to be not so much to identify things or to convey information [as, for example, Skinner's concept of "tacts" (66) ] as it is to satisfy a demand that it use that symbol in order to obtain some reward [Skinner's concept of "mands" (66) ].
In our study more than 20,000 combinations of two or more signs, produced by Nim, an infant chim,panzee, were examined for evidence of syntactic and semantic structure. Lexical regularities, in which particular signs tended to occur in particular positions, were observed in the case of two-sign combinations. It is impossible to explain these regularities as ovet-all position habits or the memorization of many individual sequences. As such, these regularities provide superficial evidence that Nim's two-sign combinations followed rules of sign order. However, other aspects of Nim's use of sign language suggest that it is unwarranted to conclude that his combinations were primitive "sentences."
The mean length of Nim's combinations fluctuated between 1.1 and 1.6 during the last 19 months of the project. During that time, the size of his vocabulary more than doubled (from 42 to 125 signs). Nim's three-sign combinations showed no evidence of lexical regularities, nor did they elaborate or qualify what he signed when he produced a twosign combination.
Our semantic analysis of Nim's twosign combinations showed that 85 percent of these combinations could be assigned unambiguously to one of 20 semantic categories. Going beyond the results of other studies, we demonstrated the reliability of our semantic judgments and also observed that certain semantic roles were expressed in particular orders \1of signs. However, our data also suggest that it is premature to apply the method of "rich interpretation" to the utterances of an ape. Not only did the number of lexical examples of each semantic role seem too few to justify the designation of order regularities as semantic (rather than lexical), but there were also too many idiosyncratic order regularities in combinations of particular signs. Thus, the evidence necessary to demonstrate a knowledge of categorical semantic rules is insufficient.
A discourse analysis of Nim's use of sign language, which related Nim's utterances to his teacher's immediately prior use of sign language, produced further evidence that Nim's use of language differed fundamentally from that of a child. Nim imitated and interrupted his teachers' utterances to a much larger extent than a child imitates and interrupts an adult's speech. This suggests that Nim was less creative than a child in producing utterances and that he had not learned the give-and-take-aspect of conversation that is evident in a child's early use of language. Analyses of films of other apes signing with their teachers revealed a similar lack of creativity in other apes' utterances, and a similar dependence of these utterances on the prior signing of their teachers. 
